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Vlieghe and Zamojski on Some Pedagogical
Problems with an Object-Oriented
‘Educational Love’
ALEXIS GIBBS AND ELIZABETH O’BRIEN
In this paper we consider some of the problems inherent in the
attempt to define and circumscribe an exclusively ‘educational
love’, as presented by Joris Vlieghe and Piotr Zamojski in a
recent paper for this journal. In seeking to move beyond the
confusing interpersonal relations involved in student-centred
discourses on teaching, the authors aim to articulate an
‘educational love’ that is more oriented towards subject
matter than the student subject. In the process, the concept of
love itself becomes increasingly abstract and open to
interpretation. Further, the attempt to reconcile these elements
in an uncomplicated ‘love for the object’, following the
example of Alain Badiou’s St Paul, constitutes an injustice to
the other subjects—the students—involved in the teaching
situation. We consider the ways in which such abstractions
might sit with student teachers, to demonstrate how and why
the intersubjective dimension—with some of the possible
emotive messiness that is implied therein—must not fade from
view, if we are to avoid conceiving of education as something
that can be purified of individual interest, motivation and
desire.
INTRODUCTION: LOVE IS A MANY-SPLENDOURED THING
In a recent Special Issue of this journal on the subject of Love and De-
sire (August 2019), Joris Vlieghe and Piotr Zamojski made a powerful
case for an ‘educational love’ peculiar to the teaching profession, and
its position at the very ‘roots of teaching’. An educational love, in their
view, must steer the teacher’s attention away from student-centred inter-
subjectivity, and towards the disciplinary subject matter in and of itself.
On our reading, this austere notion of what love consists in abjures the
great variety (and possible volatility) of emotions and experience that come
into play when teaching, often in unknowable variations according to the
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individual teacher. These variations were described in great detail elsewhere
in the Special Issue, with articles on the love of learning (Gary), nature (En-
glemann) and of God (Lewin), that prompted us to reflect on the possibility
of delineating one ‘educational love’ from the complex intersections of in-
stinct, passion, emotion and reason that might inform an individual’s role as
a teacher. It might in fact be argued that there are potentiallymany loves that
can be seen to form part of a teacher’s role, including the love of teaching
itself. David Aldridge’s paper in the Special Issue acknowledged as much,
in saying that the emotional complexities of the classroom cannot be ad-
dressed ‘simply by asserting that educational love must be of a more hon-
ourable sort than romantic love’ (Aldridge, 2019: 531). This paper seeks
to address some of the problems inherent in isolating an educational—or
impersonal—love from other modes of loving, caring, attending and inspir-
ing, as well as considering the potential implications of these problems for
someone preparing for the teaching profession.
DECLARING THE OBJECT OF ONE’S AFFECTION
Vlieghe and Zamojski’s paper emerges from a legitimate concern that edu-
cation might be, or become, too sentimental or too ideological in terms of
teacher–student relations. On the one hand, discourses of caring and culti-
vating are seen to exercise too much influence over the lives and minds of
the young, whereby the conceptualisation of love has led to confusions over
the teacher’s role as emotional surrogate. Nel Noddings and bell hooks are
cited as examples of thinkers whose work has often conflated interpersonal
relations with purely educational ones. By contrast, according to the au-
thors, we also live in a time when educational psychology seems motivated
to dispense with the language of love altogether, in favour of ‘defining ed-
ucation as a cognitive and individual process of developing knowledge and
skill’ (Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2019: 519). The authors seek to tread a new
path in pursuit of an ‘essence of teaching’, one which preserves the need
for love at the heart of education, but a love which more objectively ‘dis-
closes the world’ without the messy interference of teacherly emotion—
either paternalistic, maternalistic or erotic. The proposed reorientation is
that an educational love is more properly thought of as ‘love for the world,
not the person’ (Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2019: 518). The goal, therefore, is
an essence of education (whilst not an ‘essentialism in any traditional sense
of the word’), whilst the method is an eidetic reduction of the kind of love
proper to education only.
But this simple statement, ‘Educational love is love for the world, not
the person’, already warrants further investigation. What is the ‘world’ that
is spoken of here? What does it look like? Is it something bordered, or
boundless? If the former, how do we know that the limits of our conception
are correct? If the latter, how do we knowwhat it is that we love at all?When
we speak of the world, are we talking about the planet? Its inhabitants? Or
something more metaphysical, noumenal? The authors don’t offer a full
explanation, except to say that it is ‘something worthwhile to be attentive
to and to take care of’, and that the role of the teacher is to disclose this
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concept of ‘world’ via their particular subject. Such an endeavour already
presumes shared belief about what is worthwhile, and worth taking care of,
when the current issues of our times only attest to dissent on these matters.
This abstract conception of world, on our understanding, therefore poses a
significant problem for the student teacher, whether in terms of initiation
or intuition: how are they to know what they are disclosing, such that their
subject does justice to this disclosure? Without conceptual delineation, an
overly abstract conception of ‘the world’ has the potential to permit not just
love for—to borrow from Vlieghe and Zamojski’s title—some thing, but
any thing, and to take any subject as appropriate for its disclosure.
The abstract character of the ‘world’ is then elaborated in relation to
those to whom our love for it is disclosed. In this regard, students are of a(n
individually) faceless kind, understood only in terms of a second abstract
category, termed the ‘new generation’:
The object-side of educational love is not the student (or the teacher
seen from the perspective of the student), but the thing that is studied
in the classroom. Educational love is love for a thing, not a person. Al-
though we do grant the importance of love for children and students,
we think that this love is secondary. Or to be more precise, educational
love, taken at an interpersonal level, is not directed at individual stu-
dents, but at the new generation. (Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2019: 520)
The phrase introduced in this section, ‘the object-side of educational
love’, is neither prefaced nor elaborated upon elsewhere, and yet also de-
mands closer inspection. The invocation of the ‘object-side’ reminds us
that educational relations conventionally involve a (thinking) subject and a
(thought) object. According to classic Kantian, existential and phenomeno-
logical approaches, the ‘object-side’—whether this refers to the student as
object of teaching or the subject matter—is never fully reducible to the
‘subject-side’, because education entails a relation between two or more in-
dividuals (otherwise it is mere experience of a thing), neither of whom are
able to reduce the other—or the ‘thing’—entirely to their own subjectivity.
What we are capable of doing, however, is treating both the student subject
and subject matter as objects (something which student-centred approaches
to teaching can be as guilty of as those concerned only with outcomes). Ob-
jectification is, however, according to those philosophical approaches men-
tioned above, never a successful realisation of its own project, because it
refuses to acknowledge the projection of individual subjectivity onto that
which it seeks to objectify.
Despite these problems of intentionality, the proposal from Vlieghe and
Zamojski is that we simultaneously treat ‘the world’ and our passion for
it as sublimated in a single domain of interest, the ‘object-side’ of our ed-
ucational love. Our love for the world is thus channelled away from the
educational student subject, and towards the disciplinary subject, so as not
to confuse the teaching relationship. In so doing, the effect may be intended
to limit the emotional interference from ‘secondary’ loves, but it also suc-
ceeds in licensing an investment in the internally justified primary love of
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one’s choice: any thing, not just some thing. The transcendent horizon of
the abstract world legitimates a love fixated on a part of it (i.e. the teacher’s
disciplinary interest), with no recognition of the reciprocal involvement on
the part of other people.
So not only does the abstract notion of ‘world’ concern us, but the fact
of it having no subjective resistance to the will (or desire) of the teaching
subject. Objectification here has free reign, as there is no human subjectiv-
ity to intercede in its expression: the world is potentially whatever I want
it to be, and my love for my discipline is the particular expression of that
more general object (akin to the ideal Form of Plato). In this situation, the
human subjectivities in the classroom are almost extraneous to the project
of the teacher’s objectification of an abstract world: they are merely its ben-
eficiaries. Paradoxically, though, to situate the ‘new generation’ as those to
whom we pass on an interest in the world via our subject is made more
problematic by the consideration of whether the new generation constitutes
part of that world already. If they do, aren’t we inevitably in love with the
new generation when we teach them via our disciplinary sublimation of the
world?
In their rejection of student-centred emotionality, Vlieghe and Zomo-
jski’s teachers are able to channel their passion into a thing as the
sublimated—if not fetishised—representation of their love for the world.
This thing is said to be loved for its own sake: ‘One loves mathematics for
the sake of mathematics, and music for the sake of music’ (2019: 526).
Even if one were to question the plausibility of loving mathematics for its
own sake, it would probably have to be on the condition that such a love
be sufficient unto itself, i.e. that satisfaction required no interaction from
or with a third party. A passion for jelly moulds, the films of Fred Astaire,
or one’s partner—according to the argument that we can love some thing
for the sake of that thing only—do not require that others participate in that
love for it to bring fulfilment. So it is surprising to, then, read in Vlieghe
and Zamojski’s paper that:
In the case of such an unconditional love for something, there is also
the necessity of sharing this love with others, and especially with the
new generation. (Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2019: 526)
The logic of this statement is almost impossible to follow. There seems
to be almost no reasoning to think that a thing that gives pleasure in and of
itself, therefore, carries any concomitant requirement to be shared. Indeed,
the very introduction of the word ‘sharing’ is suggestive of an interpersonal
dimension that the authors have tried to exorcise from the teacher’s sense of
professional purpose. To share is to be responsive to another, or others; we
cannot assume a thing is of interest causa sui, in the absence of other people
to take an interest in them. The incoherence of this point is further demon-
strated by the authors’ caveat that, although we are compelled to share our
love for a thing with the new generation, we are not compelled to do so with
our love for our lovers. But why one and not the other? And what of jelly
moulds and Fred Astaire? How do we know which to share, and which not?
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Again, there is little explanation, perhaps because ‘educational love refers
to nothing concrete’ (2019: 523). But without any concrete demarcations
to either love and/or the world, we are left ultimately not just wondering
what the parameters of these concepts are, such that some things are worth
teaching and others not, but also where the mandate for this necessity to
share comes from? If it is not the other people in the learning situation (as
it is for the likes of Noddings and hooks), how does something that is of
interest to—or loved by—us become something that ought to be of interest
to others?
BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL LOVE AND EVANGELISM
To support their arguments regarding an educational love that resists in-
dulging emotional interactions with others, in pursuit of a more direct link
to a love for the world, Vlieghe and Zamojski turn to the example of St Paul,
via Alain Badiou. The authors acknowledge that their endorsement of Ba-
diou will probably prove controversial, on account of his rebellion against
much of the ‘post-structural celebration of differences’ with which they
find themselves in sympathy. Badiou’s more muscular account of Truth is
unashamedly reacting against anglophone cultural relativisms in relation to
Truth (which he perceives as being in denial of the fact that they do indeed
have a unifying force in ‘monetary abstraction’), instead wanting to assert
a ‘concrete universality of truth’ that is best embodied by the Apostle, a
revolutionary who was prepared at any cost to override the present jurisdic-
tion on account of a faith-based conviction in a new configuration between
law and the subject. In defending the idea that ‘all categories [of identity or
community] must be absented from the process [of revolutionary politics]’
(Badiou, 2003: 11), Badiou celebrates a figure who would overlook all ap-
peals to difference in pursuit of a universal truth, which he calls ‘fidelity to
the event’ (2003: 63).
Badiou’s account allows the authors to assert by analogy a notion of
truthfulness that obtains for the teacher in their discipline, but also the mo-
ment at which the teacher becomes faithful to that truth and commits to it
lifelong—described as an ‘unconditional love’ for the thing. This argument
is one that easily overrides the objections raised earlier about subjectivity
and intentionality, both of which are swept aside in the face of an event’s
inherent truthfulness. But it doesn’t seem to prevent against anyone com-
mitting to any truth of their choosing, arising from any moment that we
care to describe as an event. The authors themselves are judicious in their
referencing of Badiou’s own examples of the events of ‘Christ’s resurrec-
tion, the French Revolution, or the event of Impressionism’ (Vlieghe and
Zamojski, 2019: 534) to demonstrate the truths that extend from such occa-
sions (new attitudes towards monarchy, religious observance and painting).
But due consideration here needs to be given not only to those events we
wish to celebrate (the spectre of subjectivity), but to those which it is made
possible for others—and permissible—to celebrate also. Because not only
can any event be construed as having its own internal necessity and truth
to it, but teachers can choose to interpret and adopt truths from events at
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will. The curricular boundaries between teaching about jelly moulds and/or
about genocide then become a matter of the teacher’s own sense of mission
and purpose, irrespective of culture and classroom.
To some extent, Badiou’s portrait of St Paul provides the perfect de-
fence of an object-oriented approach to teaching. It might permit the novice
teacher to declare that, in having ‘acknowledged the event’, they have ac-
cepted the task of a militant of truth, which for their part means remaining
faithful to it as ‘internal necessity’ even at risk of ridicule or ostracism.
But this is dangerous in the world of both teaching and scholarship, where
educators and educationalists constantly meet with occasions in which cir-
cumstances will require that they adapt and change, according to the faces
and challenges that they meet. Things, and our relations to them, do not re-
main static, just as humans do not, so our love for either must be attendant
upon change—and the people that might bring it about.
Hannah Arendt, also an influence for Vlieghe and Zamojski’s paper, gives
a slightly different account of St Paul to that of Badiou. Arendt, like Badiou,
recognises that St Paul was no simple follower of Christ, but rather someone
who bent Christianity to his own worldview. On her reading, Paul changes
the shape of Christianity and gives it a different meaning altogether. She
argues that the concern of St Paul, ‘in sharp and obvious distinction from
that of the gospels, is not Jesus of Nazareth, his preaching and his deeds,
but Christ, crucified and resurrected’ (Arendt, 1978: 65). St Paul is not the
teacher that loves Christian teaching; he is the teacher that would transform
it to another end altogether. He becomes a proselyte for something new,
not simply an unconditional lover of Christianity who would communicate
that love to the next generation. Paul removes from Christianity its visible
manifestation in practical action and places its significance out of reach of
the naked eye:
Hence, when we come to Paul, the accent shifts entirely from doing
to believing, from the outward man living in a world of appearances
(himself an appearance among appearances and therefore subject to
semblance and illusion) to an inwardness which by definition never
unequivocally manifests itself and can be scrutinized only by a God
who also never appears unequivocally. The ways of this God are in-
scrutable.(Arendt, 1978: 67)
For Arendt, the figure of Paul is that of a man who was decidedly intol-
erant of the challenge presented to his way of thinking by others:
Unlike his doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, Paul’s argumentum
ad hominem, as it were, cutting short all questions with a Who-are-
you-to-ask? failed to survive the early stages of the Christian faith.
(Arendt, 1978: 72)
Arendt identifies in Paul the original philosopher of the will, but one
who, at the same time, could not reconcile the need to submit spiritually to
God’s law with carnal limitation. He is someone who found human nature
almost intolerable in the face of the task to which it ought to aspire. As an
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educator, therefore, Paul wishes to overlook any cause for self-reflection
or revaluation as presented by his audience, to affirm only what he already
knew in the first place. Educationally speaking, this comes across as a cul-
de-sac of curricular self-interest, a dead end in the way that Hannah Arendt
identifies.
Vlieghe and Zamojski may have drawn upon Arendt’s concept of ‘love
for the world’ to support one aspect to their educational love, but it conflicts
directly with another aspect, in their sympathy for Badiou’s bullish St Paul.
And it is the latter that is the more difficult to reconcile with the notion
that a love for a thing necessarily translates into the need to share it. There
are plenty of religious figures who were content with loving God for God’s
sake: why did Paul need to impress that on others? And in a secular age,
whence comes this compulsion, especially in the teaching situation? The
imperative could seemingly only come from God, as it did in the works
of, for example, Averroes, Augustine or Cardinal Newman. But who holds
that authority now? And is there really a necessity to teach things we love,
especially when a love for those we teach is excluded from the equation?
INTERNAL NECESSITY OR EGOISTIC INTIMACY? ON LOVING
SCHUBERT AND SCHUMANN
How many people pursue the love of Schubert to the conclusion that music
must not only become a default vocation to teach, but see teaching as an
act of fidelity to that love? Vlieghe and Zamojski write that we move from
an immersion in a thing to a love for it—i.e. the point at which we become
both ‘militant of truth and the teacher’—when we give our love a name. The
moment at which someone says ‘I love Schubert’ is offered as an example
of the moment at which we fall in love with a thing such that ‘it becomes an
event to which one can be faithful’ (2019: 526, emphasis in original). Here
the love of Schubert translates immediately into a love of piano playing and,
by extension, ‘something good and beautiful in the world’ (ibid.). At the
point of making this realisation, ‘the lover becomes a teacher’ and therefore
‘teaching becomes a matter of internal necessity’ (ibid.). Again, it is hard
to see in each instance why the one necessarily follows from the other, but
even if we were to take this idea at face value, the evidence of it in reality
is somewhat lacking.
In looking for an example of someone who is in love with Schubert the
way the authors describe, we were reminded of Michael Haneke’s The Pi-
ano Teacher, a film in which a self-mutilating teacher, Erika Kohut (played
by Isabelle Huppert), embarks on a sadomasochistic affair with a young
student. On the surface of things, the relationship is ignited by their mutual
love of the piano, particularly the music of Schubert and Schumann. On
their first encounter, the pupil, Walter, recognises in Erika the qualities of
someone who is invested in the music she teaches well beyond the sorts of
results she hopes to bring about as a result:
Walter: I’d say you are a good teacher.
Erika: Thank you.
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Walter: You talk about things as if they were yours. It’s rare.
Erika’s response is to say ‘Schubert and Schumann are my favourites,
that’s all’. But that is not all: Erika is clearly in love with Schubert and
Schumann enough to want to share them with the next generation via her
piano pedagogy, but there is an excess to her objective affection for them
also. Neither with Walter nor with some of her other pupils does she suc-
ceed in objectifying that love to the point that other emotions do not play a
part.
The example of The Piano Teacher doesn’t quite do credit to the points
that Vlieghe and Zamojski are trying to endorse, but it does expose the
problematic underbelly of what their arguments permit. Our educators may
often act in the belief that they are only interested in imparting an apprecia-
tion for the world via their particular subjects, but the complex repressions
that occur in this process demonstrate that human psychology is simply not
equipped with the means to isolate emotional, erotic and educational loves
from one another as neatly as we might like. As David Aldridge argues
in his paper on ‘Education’s Love Triangle’, there are tensions inherent in
the teacher–student–subject love triangle, competitors for the teacher’s at-
tention and conflicting routes to fulfilment (Aldridge, 2019: 541 and 544).
The destructiveness in the relationship between Erika Kohut and her pupil
comes about because of their inabilities to satisfy one another despite their
mutual passion. The passion for Schubert and Schumann comes to frustrate,
rather than mediate, their relationship.
Of course, the film is about many other things than just about teach-
ing, but it does demonstrate just how easily a love for some thing both
sublimates a number of other desires and behaves destructively as a con-
sequence of that sublimation. The implication for teaching, and especially
people looking to become teachers, is not so much that we need to chan-
nel our unconditional love for the truthful object, but that we need greater
transparency around our interests and desires, and how they become in-
vested in various aspects of our professional roles. The dangers of con-
fusing shared passions and, for instance, sexual desire are well and justly
explored in Kevin Williams’ contribution to the same Special Issue. But
the ‘inappropriateness of the erotic’ (Williams, 2019: 560), we would ar-
gue, is perhaps better dealt with through open conversations on the subject
in Teacher Education, rather than by generating a myth of eroticism’s com-
plete surmountability in the essentialism of an educational love.
A less polemical example of how music elides both personal and pro-
fessional passions is provided by Roland Barthes, in his essay ‘Loving
Schumann’. Here, he admits that our passions for things are always hard
to contextualise, because they may not always be consistent with the times
in which we live (making them, in Nietzschean terms, ‘untimely’). Material
factors (such as the medium of our music consumption—live performance,
recorded music, radio etc.), for example, will condition listeners into an ap-
preciation of artists who more conform to the current climes. But unlike the
calling of Christianity for St Paul, Barthes believes that certain composers
call out to different individuals in particular ways. He, for instance, has a
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different appreciation for the undervalued Schumann because he first came
to piano via performance, and ‘Schumann lets his music be fully heard by
someone who plays it’ (Barthes, 1986: 294–295). What’s more, this love for
the physical act of piano playing itself emerged as something both multi-
sensory and relational: ‘I myself began listening to Beethoven’s symphonies
only by playing them with four hands, with a close friend as enthusiastic
about them as I was’ (Barthes, 1986: 294). Barthes here draws attention to
the fact that our loves do not emerge out of a vacuum: we need hands and
friends to fall in love, not a sense of divine mission.
Barthes also admits that the Schumannian is always a lover of selfish soli-
tude, because the music invites a certain kind of intimacy, and ‘intimacy is
always a little egoistic’ (1986: 295). If it is the case that our love for a thing
can’t help but betray an element of egoism within it also, then it is not
just the next generation that is implied in our love for the world, but our
selves also. We don’t have to accept that Barthes’ account is right, but we
ought to accept that it is possible—and if so, it makes us think twice about
whether the sharing—if not the preaching—of our loves indeed always en-
tails a purely ‘internal necessity’, as Vlieghe and Zamojski would have it
(Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2019: 521); indeed, it may well be an unacknowl-
edged and yet healthy aspect of our egoism that serves a useful function in
inviting others in also, to ‘take up the call to engage with the subject matter
in their own (unforeseen) ways’, as Vlieghe and Zamojski put it.
But sharing (with others) is still neither a necessary dimension of love
(as we have discussed above), nor is it necessarily a desirable one. It is
mostly contingent upon context and environment, with some acts of shar-
ing being entirely and understandably taboo. Barthes writes of his relation-
ship to Schumann as a ‘private, even individual’ experience that cannot
be shared by those without appropriate induction into a culture. We might
take this for an elitist take on music appreciation, but Barthes frames it in
terms of humility—our loves are often inexplicable to others because they
arise out of particular conditions, and that inexplicability (or elitism) ‘is the
price that must be paid if we want to renounce the arrogance of the univer-
sal’ (Barthes, 1986: 295). This arrogance arises when we want to surmount
or underwrite the complexity of people’s affections, emotions, fetishisms,
eroticisms and passions with a universal (and normative) ‘Love’. Our loves
for certain things might even be, as Barthes suggests, ‘untimely’ and lead a
subject who delights in them ‘to posit himself in his time according to the
injunctions of his desire and not according to his sociality’ (ibid.), but this is
only further recognition of the fact that nothing obliges our appreciation of
something to be carried over into its intellectual or professional application.
People have multifarious interests, and it is therefore good judgement that
tells them which interests discover their best audiences amongst friends,
lovers, acquaintances, colleagues and students.
CONCLUSION: FALLING IN LOVE AGAIN (WITH TEACHING)
Our observations here are motivated more by a concern for clarification
than by a condemnation of intent. Too much is left open to chance and/or
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interpretation in our reading of Vlieghe and Zamojski’s paradigmatic ‘ed-
ucational love’, such that the reorienting away from the student centre to-
wards a subject centre doesn’t eliminate the misapplication of love, passion
or desire. Further, to fully realise the ideal of a ‘love for some-thing’ in
practice would mean simultaneously removing from all the ‘some ones’
in the educational process the sorts of qualities that might get in the way,
i.e. anything that might be called their humanity, in all its individualised
complexity. It is this complexity that also compels the ethical relation in
education: to believe only in the truth of the event is to rule out account-
ability to those outside of it. On both counts—elucidation and ethics—the
idea of an ‘educational love’ is precarious for those entering the teaching
profession.
This is not to be deliberately contrary: we are entirely in favour of greater
teacher freedom, and in favour of student teachers thinking about how to be
creative and responsive in relation to both the subjects of their interest and
the students to whom they impart that interest. In this, we agree with David
Aldridge, writing in the same issue of the journal, that ‘[the educational
gift] cannot be given without some opening on the part of the one who is to
receive it, which requires that the teacher is responsive to the particular sen-
sibilities and partialities of each student’ (Aldridge, 2019: 538). Teachers
do have to have something to teach, and the more passionate and invested
they are, the better. But this is all for nought if they are not able to teach to
and with people, to communicate effectively and appropriately in response
to others. This relationality and responsiveness need not be reducible to a
model of mother or lover, nor need it be entirely student-centred—we can
be equally responsive to our subject matter also. Barthes’ reflections on
Schumann account for the possibility that we learn from and respond to
the thing with which we are in love, rather than simply treat it as complete
object ripe for proselytisation.
In place of reciprocity, Vlieghe and Zamojski posit the generosity of ed-
ucational love, one that is a ‘giving love spreading itself over all, regardless
of who they are’ (2019: 527). But this understanding of generosity is only
possible within the framework of an objective character given to both stu-
dent and subject matter, whereby Pauline conversion becomes the inevitable
pedagogy: ‘once one has fallen in love with something, one cannot but try
and drag in others (i.e. to seduce them) to develop a similar interest and
devotion’ (2019: 527). To speak of love and of dragging people into en-
gagement with a subject, out of your own sense of internal necessity, is
an unnecessarily unilateral approach at a time when members of the next
generation—individually and collectively—are constantly reminding their
educators to revaluate their teaching content, to make it not just relatable,
relevant and relational, but to ensure it is not imposed without due consider-
ation for its inheritance. At the same time, educators are now significantly
more aware of the structure of the classroom, the tone of the teacher, the
medium or media of the lesson in the fullness of their potential to grant or
restrict access. They can express their loves (for teaching, for students, for
their subject matter) in so many ways, and these are to be celebrated.
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